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Introduction
Plaintiffs—Internet platforms 1 generally—want it both ways. For decades,
Internet platforms relying on Section 230 have insisted they are mere “conduits” for
hosting the speech of others. 2 Here, Internet platforms claim that their hosting
decisions are their “speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.” Opp. 7.
Both cannot be true.
After all, Plaintiffs do not dispute that “requiring someone to host another
person’s speech is often a perfectly legitimate thing for the Government to do.”
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y, 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2098 (2020) (threeJustice

dissent,

making

undisputed

point).

Nor

that

“[t]he

First

Amendment . . . does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that
private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of
communication, the free flow of information and ideas.” Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994). Plaintiffs respond, in essence, that the Internet is different.
That may be a distinction, but it is not a principled one. As even Plaintiffs do not
dispute, they are the “modern public square” and “provide perhaps the most
powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.”
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). If Plaintiffs want an
1

This reply uses “Plaintiffs” to include the three Internet platforms at issue
here. Mot. 3 n.3.
2

See Mot. 9; Twitter MTD, Fields v. Twitter, 2016 WL 2586923 n.5 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 6, 2016); see also MTD Reply, Colon v. Twitter, Google, and Facebook, 2019 WL
7835413 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2019) (Platforms asserting they use “neutral tools [to]
filter or arrange third-party content” and they do not “creat[e]” or “develop[]” any
third-party content).
1
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exception from these generally applicable doctrines, that is an argument for the
Supreme Court, not this one.
Plaintiffs’ most conspicuous omission, however, is Section 230. 47 U.S.C.
§ 230. The Attorney General explained comprehensively why Section 230 is “highly
relevant” here. Mot. 8, 9-10, 13-14. Section 230 makes Plaintiffs “liable . . . for the
speech that is properly attributed to them.” Nemet Chevrolet v. Consumeraffairs.com,
591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs have said for years that Section 230
protects them because their users’ speech is not attributable to them. Now, without
so much as acknowledging their Section 230 advocacy, let alone attempting to
reconcile it with their positions here, Plaintiffs are demanding a First Amendment
right to control the same speech that they have consistently asserted is not their own.
The First Amendment does not require this Court to indulge such gamesmanship.

Argument
I. HB20’s Hosting Rule is Constitutional.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that no First Amendment problem
arises when government requires platforms to merely host third-party speech. Mot.
12-17. That has long been incontrovertible for communications mediums, like
Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1, 14 (1894) (“Telegraph
companies . . . have doubtless a duty to the public to receive, to the extent of their
capacity, all messages clearly and intelligibly written, and to transmit them upon
reasonable terms.”). The Supreme Court has extended the rule to noncommunications media. See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006); PruneYard

2
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Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). And even hosting regulations that affect
a platform’s own rights may still pass constitutional muster. Turner Broad Sys. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994). HB20’s Hosting Rule fits well within these
principles.

A. The Supreme Court’s “hosting” precedent applies to the Internet.
Plaintiffs’ primary response is to say that this hosting precedent “has no place
in evaluating First Amendment rights on the Internet.” Opp. 19, see also id. 7-8, 10
(citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)). But “the basic principles of freedom of
speech and the press . . . do not vary when a new and different medium for
communication appears.” Brown v. EMA, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (cleaned up).
Government can require Internet platforms to host speech just like it has historically
required telegraph, telephone, and cable companies to do so. Reno, by contrast, dealt
with a law doing the opposite of the Hosting Rule—it “effectively suppresse[d] a large
amount of speech” (and was content-based to boot). 541 U.S. at 874. And Reno did
not even make the Internet off-limits for laws that suppress speech when it explained
that a more narrowly tailored law could suffice. Id. at 879.
Plaintiffs contend, however, (at 15-16) that websites “are inherently
‘expressive’ disseminators” of speech, and Plaintiffs’ spaces are their own
“expressive product.” If anything, as Plaintiffs have maintained time and again, 3 the
opposite is true: Internet platforms tend to be hosts. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3)
(Internet should be “forum” for “true diversity of political discourse”). Plaintiffs’

3

See supra n.2.
3
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“expressive product” theory conflicts with their longstanding Section 230 advocacy,
where they have consistently argued that they do not “develop[]”any third-party
speech “in whole or in part.” 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1), (f)(3); Mot. 9. There is no way to
reconcile, on the one hand, being a blameless “conduit” when a user defames
someone or worse, with, on the other, creating an “inherently expressive” product
by selectively restricting willing users’ speech. Plaintiffs tellingly do not even try.
Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s dicta (Opp. 4) from the net neutrality litigation is also
inapposite. U.S. Telecom v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017). That saga was about
whether the FCC could require Internet service providers (“ISPs” like Comcast—
not Plaintiffs) to neutrally transmit all Internet traffic. U.S. Telecom v. FCC, 825 F.3d
674, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The FCC promulgated the (now void) net neutrality rules
to “spur[] investment and development.” Id. at 694. Censorship was an
afterthought—unlike Plaintiffs, the ISPs had almost never behaved that way. See id.
at 762 (Williams, J., concurring in part).
Plaintiffs’ spaces are also not an end-product “inextricably intertwined” with
underlying expressive components. Opp. 12. Plaintiffs seek refuge in the rule that the
“process of creating a form of pure speech (such as writing or painting)” warrants
as much protection as the “product” thereof “(the essay or the artwork).” Turner
v. Lt. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 689 (5th Cir. 2017). But the Hosting Rule requires
Plaintiffs to host others’ creative processes and products. Plaintiffs’ reliance on
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), illustrates the flaw in their argument. Justice
Thomas concluded that the First Amendment protects against compelled use of
4
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one’s “artistic talent[] to create” a product; but he recognized that this is different
in kind from “being forced to provide a forum for a third party’s speech,” id. at 1743,
1744-45—exactly what the Hosting Rule requires.

B. Plaintiffs are nothing like newspapers or parades.
Plaintiffs fall back on the argument (Opp. 3-4, 12-14) that they are like
newspapers and parades with an “editorial” censorship right. But their authorities
here—Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), and Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) 4—are distinguishable in several ways,
as the Attorney General explained. See Mot. 14-17. Plaintiffs suggest (at 13) that the
“newspapers’ limited space” should not be a dispositive distinction. But binding
precedent says it is. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64 (“compelled printing of a reply [in Tornillo]
t[ook] up space that could be devoted to other material”); Mot. 14-15. Plaintiffs
contend (at 13) that this means digital newspapers could be forced to host speech.
Digital newspapers, however, differ from Plaintiffs in additional dispositive respects.
“[U]nlike newspapers” (including online versions), Plaintiffs “hold themselves out
as organizations that focus on distributing the speech of the broader public.” Biden
v. Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1222, 1224 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring);
see Mot. 15; ROA.345-46. Plaintiffs neither acknowledge that distinction nor address

4

Plaintiffs also cite (at 11) cases holding that government generally may not
restrict the speech a host can disseminate. No one disputes that. And Manhattan
Community Access Corp. v. Halleck (Opp. 8, 14) is about whether the First
Amendment may operate to require hosting of its own force. 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
This case is about the “distinct question” of whether government may require
hosting. Id. at 1931, n.2.
5
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the fact that, unlike newspapers, Plaintiffs do not pre-screen content before
disseminating it. See Mot. 15. They cite (at 14) a report claiming Plaintiffs sometimes
quickly take down offensive content—not that they prohibit it from circulating in the
first place. And Plaintiffs’ slippery slope hypotheticals (at 3-4) about bookstores,
theaters, and comedy clubs all fail. 5
Plaintiffs’ parade analogy also fails. The key with parades is the probability of
“speech misattribution.” See Agency for Int’l Dev., 140 S. Ct. at 2095 (describing
Hurley). Viewers would have no way of knowing that a rogue marcher’s message
lacks the organizers’ blessing. Plaintiffs say (at 4) that this is their problem too,
because as hosts they essentially “express the message that the disseminated speech
is worthy of presentation.” But Plaintiffs host terrorist content. See Mot. 9-10. And
“[s]omething well north of 99%” of speech they host “never gets reviewed.”
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, 2021 WL 2690876, *8 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021). They
operate nothing like the Hurley parade, which screened marchers and had “no
customary practice” of “disavow[ing]” specific ones. 515 U.S. at 576. Granted,
some unreasonable observers might attribute third-party speech to Plaintiffs. But that
argument was made and rejected in FAIR. See Br. Amici Curiae of Nat’l Lesbian &
Gay Law Ass’n, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 2005 WL 2347167, at *7 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2005)
(students asserting they would “perceive their schools as endorsing the military’s
discriminatory policies”).
5

Such a slippery-slope argument is surprising considering that Section 230
immunity is premised on the notion that bookstores and internet platforms should
be treated differently. See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331-32 (4th Cir.
1997). Again, plaintiffs make no effort to explain their inconsistent positions.
6
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C. The Platforms are also analogous to, and may be regulated like,
common carriers.
In all events, the Hosting Rule is a constitutionally permissible common-carrier
regulation. Mot. 17-19. Plaintiffs contend (at 18) they are not true common carriers.
The common carriage touchstone, however, is whether one “hold[s] oneself out
indiscriminately to the clientele one is suited to serve” and does not “make
individualized decisions” about “whether and on what terms to deal.” Nat’l Ass’n
of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“NARUC”).
That is precisely how Plaintiffs have held themselves out to the public. ROA345.46;
Mot. 13. At a bare minimum, Plaintiffs are analogous to common carriers and may be
regulated similarly. See Biden, 141. S. Ct. at 1223 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ view (at 19-20), “nothing approaching monopoly” is required
to justify common carriage regulation. NARUC, 525 F.2d at 641.

D. The Hosting Rule satisfies any appropriate level of scrutiny.
Plaintiffs’ plea for strict scrutiny also fails. PruneYard and FAIR foreclose
Plaintiffs’ argument (at 26) that HB20 discriminates on the basis of viewpoint
because it prevents them from discriminating against viewpoints; if that were true,
every hosting requirement would be viewpoint-based. Plaintiffs’ argument (at 26)
that HB20 is content-based because it applies to the Platforms and not dissimilar
websites also fails: “[T]he fact that a law singles out a certain medium” or even “a
subset thereof” is “insufficient to raise First Amendment concerns.” Turner, 512
U.S. at 660. And HB20’s exceptions are likewise constitutional. Compare Opp. 27,
with Mot. 19-20.

7
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Regardless, Texas’s interest in “protecting the free exchange of ideas and
information” is—far from inadequate (Opp. 27-28) 6—one “of the highest order, for
it promotes values central to the First Amendment.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 663. And
Texas is not (Opp. 28) attempting to “restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others.” See Turner, 512 U.S. at 657
(rejecting identical argument). HB20 is also not flawed for failing to regulate
smaller/dissimilar entities (Opp. 29)—such regulation might have caused
constitutional problems. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 96-97 (Powell, J., concurring)
(expressing doubt whether hosting rules could be applied to small establishments).
Plaintiffs’ argument (at 29-30) that Texas could have created its own social media
platform also fails. See Mot. 20-21.

II. HB20’s Disclosure Requirements Are Constitutional.
HB20’s disclosure requirements are also constitutional. The core dispute here
is whether Zauderer’s standard applies, which permits compelled disclosure of
“purely factual and uncontroversial information” that is not “unduly burdensome.”
Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985);
Opp. 24 (recognizing this test). Zauderer applies not just to “commercial
advertising,” as Plaintiffs would have it (Opp. 24), but to a range of other disclosures
such as “health and safety warnings” and “disclosures about commercial
products.” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376
(2018); CTIA – The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 844 (9th Cir.
6

Plaintiffs wrongly assert (at 27) that the Attorney General forfeited this
interest. It appears in HB20’s text, ROA.66, and it was raised below, ROA.1074.
8
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2019). HB20 comfortably fits within this genre of disclosure laws. Mot. 23-25.
Plaintiffs’ authorities (at 22-23) for a more rigorous standard are inapposite. Herbert
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), addressed whether a defamation plaintiff could obtain
discovery into the editorial processes that defamed him. It held yes—and Plaintiffs
are in no way “editors” anyways. Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th
Cir. 2019), addressed disclosures only in the sui generis political campaign setting.
See id. at 513 (law “single[d] out one particular topic of speech—campaign related
speech”).
Under Zauderer, Plaintiffs’ arguments all fail. The complaint-and-appeal
process, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 120.101-104, is not (Opp. 24) unduly
burdensome. It is standard-fare economic regulation essentially requiring certain
minimum standards for how businesses treat their clients—this is not even subject
to the low Zauderer bar for compelled speech. Mot. 25. It is also no answer (Opp. 2526) that the biannual transparency report, Tex. Bus & Com. Code § 120.053 would
require “voluminous data collection and calculation.” The SEC’s reporting
requirements—and countless other similar financial and other rules—require
comparable voluminous collection. See Mot. 24-25. Plaintiffs are not bold enough to
argue against all of these laws—which would give away how untenable their position
is. And the disclosure requirements are not “vague” (Opp. 25), as even the district
court agreed. ROA.2596.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue (at 25) that some of these disclosures “may” result in
release of “trade secrets” or information that could “enable[] predators to evade
detection.” Their only support for these implausible assertions is self-serving
9
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deposition testimony asserting that disclosure of “any kind of information about the
inner workings” of platforms could have these effects. ROA.1437 40:12-18. That is
wrong, and Plaintiffs could tailor their disclosures to omit information that would
compromise trade secrets or benefit predators.

III. The Equities Favor the Attorney General.
Plaintiffs’ asserted harms that will flow if HB20 takes effect are implausible
because the Hosting Rule requires Plaintiffs to operate in materially the same way
they used to operate. Mot. 25-26. And the disclosure requirements require
publication of information that Plaintiffs in large measure already compile. Id. By
contrast, the preliminary injunction is injuring Texas and inflicting significant harm
on Texans’ ability to freely speak and receive information. Id. at 26.

Conclusion
The Court should stay the district court’s preliminary injunction pending
appeal.
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